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Recent Developments

LEE v. CLINE:
The Maryland Tort Claims Act Broadens the Scope of Qualified
Immunity Afforded to State Personnel to Encompass Both
Intentional Torts and Constitutional Torts
By: Stephanie Freer

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that qualified
immunity afforded to state personnel under the Maryland Tort Claims
Act (MTCA) encompasses both intentional torts and constitutional
torts. Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 863 A.2d 297 (2004). In a case of
first impression, the court concluded the MTCA insulates state
personnel from all types of tort claims absent a sufficient showing of
actual malice. !d. at 253, 863 A.2d at 302.
On the morning of March 12, 1994, Keith Lee ("Lee"), an
African-American, left his home in Maryland to run various errands in
his BMW automobile. Lee made several stops, one of which was at a
car wash. Sometime later, Lee noticed his car's front license plate was
missing and correctly surmised the plate had come off at the car wash.
When he returned to retrieve it, the plate was so mangled he was
unable to re-attach it. Lee placed the plate on the rear floor of the car
behind the driver's seat and continued his errands.
At 3:00 p.m., while Lee was still running errands, Frederick
County Deputy Sheriff Gary Cline ("Cline") pulled him over. Cline
told Lee he stopped Lee because his front license plate was missing.
Lee explained the plate had fallen off at the car wash and showed
Cline the mangled plate. Cline then asked Lee to consent to a vehicle
search for illegal narcotics and weapons but Lee refused. Cline
subsequently ran a check on Lee's plate. Cline was informed that
Lee's plate was valid and that Lee had no points on his license or a
criminal record. Despite this information, Cline requested a canine
unit, and upon arrival, the canine circled Lee's car indicating there was
no sign of drugs.
Lee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County
against Cline alleging he was detained and searched because the
Frederick County Sheriffs Department targets African-American
males who drive expensive cars. Lee's complaint further stated that at
no time did Cline have probable cause and that Cline's acts amounted
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to an unreasonable search and setzure m violation of his state
constitutional rights.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cline,
finding no violation of Lee's state constitutional rights. The lower
court determined that Cline had qualified immunity under the MTCA
with regard to non-constitutional tort claims and that Lee presented no
evidence of malice to overcome that privilege. Lee appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the trial court's
findings. The Court of Appeals granted Lee's writ of certiorari to
determine whether the MTCA grants qualified immunity to state
personnel for tort actions based upon both violations of the state
constitution and common law intentional torts.
The court initially looked to the ordinary and natural meaning
of the language of the statute. !d. at 253, 863 A.2d at 302.
Specifically, the MTCA provides, "state personnel shall have
immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article." !d. That section provides immunity
from liability in tort to state personnel so long as the acts or omissions
are within the scope of public duty and made without malice or gross
negligence. !d.
The court determined that it had not directly decided whether
the MTCA actually covers intentional torts and constitutional torts.
From an initial plain reading of the statute, the MTCA appeared to
cover intentional torts and constitutional torts so long as committed
within the scope of state employment and without malice or gross
negligence. !d. at 256, 863 A.2d at 304.
Despite the statutory language, Lee argued immunity granted
by the MTCA should have no application to state constitutional or
intentional torts. !d. at 258, 863 A.2d at 305. Lee based his argument
on grounds that Maryland has consistently held common law qualified
immunity has no application in tort actions based upon alleged
violations of state constitutional rights or upon intentional torts. !d.
Nonetheless, the court distinguished Maryland's common law
qualified immunity doctrine for public officials from that of the
MTCA. !d. at 259, 863 A.2d at 306.
The purpose of the Maryland public official immunity
principle, the court reasoned, is to ensure that public officials, in the
performance of "important public dut[ies] ha[ve] the freedom and
authority to make decisions and choices." !d. at 260-61, 863 A.2d at
306. Thus, the court found, the defense of public official immunity is
very narrow and generally applies only to negligent acts. !d.
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In contrast, the court established that the MTCA generally
insulates state employees from tort liability if their actions are within
the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence. Id.
at 261, 863 A.2d at 307. This broader purpose wholly applies to nonmalicious intentional torts and constitutional torts. !d.
Another distinction between public official immunity and the
MTCA is significant with regard to constitutional torts. !d. at 262, 863
A.2d at 307. The court found that a substantial difference exists
between public official immunity and the immunity granted by the
MTCA. !d. This distinction is based squarely on Article 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights ("Article 19"), which provides the
right to every person, for any injury done to their person or property,
to seek available remedies from the court. Id. In support of this
principle in Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909), the
court staunchly declined to extend state governmental immunity to
public officials breaching citizens' constitutional rights. !d. at 263, 863
A.2d at 308.
As to non-constitutional tort actions, the court concluded that
the effect of Article 19 is somewhat more elastic. The test is one of
reasonableness. Id. at 264, 863 A.2d at 308. Article 19 provides a
degree of constitutional protection even for causes of action not based
on constitutional rights if there is an unreasonable restriction upon
one's ability to seek redress for their injuries. Id. at 265, 863 A.2d at
309. For this reason, the court has consistently held that the legislature
has the authority to substitute state liability for individual employee
liability. !d. Since MTCA substitution process is identical to that
authorized by the legislature, the court found that the requirements of
Article 19 were satisfied. !d. at 266, 863 A.2d at 310.
Nevertheless, a sufficient showing of malice will overcome
qualified immunity afforded to state personnel under the MTCA. Id.
at 268, 863 A.2d at 311. In Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 725
A.2d 549 (1999), the court defined "actual malice" as "conduct
characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and
deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud." !d. The court applied this
definition in Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118 (2000),
finding that intent and motive are vital elements in the determination
of whether malice is shown. Id. at 269s, 863 A.2d at 311. In the
instant case, the court concluded the facts, like those in Okwa,
supported an inference of Cline's ill-will; as such, the issue of malice
generated a jury question. !d. at 270, 863 A.2d at 312.
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The holding in this case broadens the scope of the MTCA by
affording qualified immunity to state personnel in all types of tort
claims unless there is an ample showing of malice. Where the MTCA
previously only provided immunity with regard to non-constitutional
tort claims, it is likely that this decision will further insulate stateemployed tortfeasors from responsibility while drastically reducing the
ability of aggrieved parties to seek redress for a violation of their
fundamental rights.
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